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This paper is a report on my attempts to explore the relationship between
the capital structure choices firms make and the characteristics of the
product market environments in which they operate. The hypothesis with
which I began and which will serve to structure the initial exposition was
quite simple. If optimizing a corporation's capital structure is a way of
reducing total costs (or equivalently of raising the total market value of
the firm), then firms under competitive pressure in the product markets
might "optimize" their capital structures more carefully than firms that
occupy positions in the product market sheltered to some extent from
competition.
I was led to hypotheses of this type by observing, in a number of
instances, that firms with strong product market positions appeared to
have widely divergent approaches to capital structure policy. Some, like
IBM, had little debt for extensive periods of time. Others, like Tandy
Corporation, were highly leveraged and readjusted their capital struc-
tures periodically by issuing debt and buying in stock. Other corpora-
tions, operating in highly competitive environments, seemed to me to
exhibit less variability in the amounts of debt they issued (in relation to
total assets). Cases of this type, of course, are not necessarily selected
randomly. Nor do they establish that capital structure has a significant
effect on total costs or firm value. This research is therefore an attempt to
explore these hypotheses with a larger and less potentially biased sample
of firms.
I should say at the outset that I agree with scholars who argue that
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corporations are subject to pressure from both product and capital mar-
ket sources. External product market pressures operate directly on
profitability and on returns to investment. Capital markets, through
withholding investment funds by bidding down the price of the equity or
through takeovers, may intervene when the operations, investment deci-
sions, or financing decisions of the corporation are mismanaged.
By focusing on the product market side, I do not mean to imply that
capital market influences are unimportant. On the other hand, to pursue
this line of research, as a matter of logic I do have to maintain as a
hypothesis that the capital market pressure is not always sufficient to
remove all but short-run deviations from optimal financial policies. If this
were not true, there would be no deviations to explain. I shall say more
about this later in the context of the statistical results.
The capital and product markets are not mutually exclusive constrain-
ing forces. A takeover could be the mechanism by which a failure to
minimize costs is removed. The hypothesis here is that capital markets do
not remove all deviations, and that management, with or without capital
market intervention, react to pressure on profits from a competitive
environment by trying to reduce costs further. Therefore, if capital
structure affects costs, then intensely competitive product market en-
vironments will, on average, reduce deviations from optimal capital
structure for corporations operating in that kind of environment.
The paper in outline is as follows. Section 10.2 sets out the formal
statement of the hypotheses just discussed. Section 10.3 describes the
variables used to characterize the product market environment of the
firm. Section 10.4 presents the preliminary results of testing the hypoth-
esis. In sections 10.5 and 10.6,1 explore two related questions using the
same database. One concerns the relationship between a corporation's
product market position and its profitability. The other deals with the
extent to which the product market variables and certain financial vari-
ables are capable of explaining the corporation's actual capital structure.
I emphasize "actual" here to distinguish these results from those reported
in section 10.4, where the issue is the divergence between actual and a
calculated optimal capital structure. Section 10.7 summarizes the results
and draws some conclusions. An appendix details the sources of the data.
It may be useful to provide a brief statement of the results in advance. I
can find very little evidence that deviations of actual from calculated
optimal capital structures are influenced at all by the product market
environment. These results are consistent with the view that there are no
optimal capital structures. I do find that the product market environment
explains a substantial amount of the variance across firms in returns on
total investment. Thus the product market variables cannot be dismissed
as poor descriptions of the product market environment. In addition, I
find that the product market variables and measures of profitability are355 Capital Structure and the Product Market Environment
correlated with actual capital structures, and in regressions "explain" a
substantial amount of the variance in the ratio of debt to assets.
These results do not establish that the corporation's capital structure
influences its costs or its total market value. It is possible that either
management or investors have preferences with respect to capitalization
that are reflected in what we see in the data, but which are not exclusively
preferences for higher as opposed to lower value. On the other hand, the
fact that variables describing the product market environment and the
firm's profitability "explain" variations in capital structure is certainly not
strong evidence that would lead one to accept the hypothesis that capital
structure and value are unrelated.
It is difficult to know exactly where these preferences arise. Corpora-
tions like IBM and Polaroid with profitable market positions and high
levels of investment in research and product development appear to shy
away from debt except when financial resource constraints require it.
Even then, equity financing has often been preferred. There are numer-
ous examples of firms that avoid debt because they have had what they
regard as bad experiences with banks. Historically, Crown Cork and Seal
is an example. On the other hand, some corporations like Tandy Cor-
poration persistently readjust their capital structures to keep leverage up.
In Tandy's case, those decisions are described by management in annual
reports as optimizing the capital structure. Tandy's original growth was
financed in part by substantial loans from a few banks. It is likely that
there was a somewhat unusual partnership between the corporation and
the banks in this case.
Diverse capital structures within an industry could result from tax
clienteles.
1 Moreover, investors probably do have industry preferences as
part of their strategies for diversification. That would produce capital
market pressure for heterogeneity in capital structure at the industry
level. If that were the only force operating on capital structure, then one
would expect to see deviations of actual from average capital structures
that are random with respect to industry characteristics and competitive
pressure. That is to say, there would be a nonzero variance in capital
structure, but it would not be systematically related to the industry's
characteristics. The statistical model below does not require that the
variance in the deviation of actual from average capital structure be zero
if competitive pressure has no effect.
10.2 The Statistical Model of Deviations of
Actual from Optimal Capital Structures
The underlying hypothesis is that firms have optimal capital structures
which depend on the industries in which they compete. For the moment,
let us assume that each industry i has an optimal capital structure ut. Let356 A. Michael Spence
Sji be the share of the ;th firm's assets in industry i. I assume that the
optimal capital structure for firm / is
(1) fj = ^sjiui.
The actual capital structure of firm j is dj. Capital structure here is
measured by the ratio of debt, both current and long term, to total assets.
Let Xj be a vector of attributes of firm;, describing the industries in which
it operates and its competitive position in those industries. (I describe
what are useful measures of these attributes in the next section.)
The main hypothesis is that the actual capital structure, d, is a random
variable with a mean of/and a variance of v




The hypothesis is that as product market pressure declines, the variance
v
2 increases.
There is an assumption implicit in this formulation of the hypothesis. It
is that the degree to which the optimal capital structure is indeed optimal
is constant across industries. Or, to put it another way, the cost of being
away from the optimal capital structure does not vary from one industry
to the next. This assumption is unlikely to be strictly true. But to circum-
vent it, one would need to reinsert an explicit model of the determinants
of optimal capital structure, a problem that, as the reader can see, I was
trying to avoid. It is perhaps worth noting that similar problems confront
most empirical work on industry structure and profitability due to incom-
plete data on the behavior of the cost functions. In the model tested here,
to the extent that industry and firm characteristics are correlated with the
costs of being away from optimal capital structure, these variables will
pick up that effect. But it will not be identified distinctly from the effects
of competitive pressure.
It would be preferable to generalize this model to allow the optimal
capital structure to depend on the firm's position in the industries in
which it competes, and also on the mix of businesses that it is in. That is to
say, it is arguable that optimal capital structure as well as deviations from
it depend on x. For reasons that will be apparent shortly, that approach is
not computationally feasible at the present time. In fact, the present
approach strains resources as it is.
If we assume that d or its log is normally distributed, the probability of
observing the sample, conditional on the parameters, is







The log of the likelihood function, the minimum of which yields the
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters, is357 Capital Structure and the Product Market Environment
(4) S=(/i/2)log(2ir) + ? log(a;)
] ' i
The dependence of the variance on the firm's characteristics is parame-
terized as follows:
(5) v = exp (- b - x).
This ensures that the likelihood function is convex in b and that v is
positive.
The conditions for an optimum are in two groups. First the optimal
capital structures for industries. Given vf,j=l,...,n, the maximum
likelihood estimate of u = (u1, . . . , um) is the weighted regression
coefficients






where d = (dx,..., dn), D is a diagonal matrix with D;y = vf, and 5 is the n x m matrix whose elements are the s;,. There are practical problems
with performing this regression because the number of four-digit indus-
tries is 450. We have data on 403 of those. A regression with 403 variables
is a nontrivial problem in straight calculation. Nevertheless, the problem
is conceptually simple.
The second set of conditions are essentially conditions for the optimal
estimates of the determinants of the variances across firms, given the
deviations of optimal from actual capital structure. Let
(7) ej = dj-^sjiui.
Given u, the maximum likelihood estimates of b satisfy
(8) f
Solutions to these equations in b give the effects of firm and industry
characteristics on the variance, that is, the tendency to deviate from the
optimal capital structure.
At several points in what follows, I refer to the optimal capital struc-
ture for the firm and/or industry. These terms always refer to the calcu-
lated optimal structure (6) for the industry and (7) for the firm. Both can
be thought of as "suitable" averages of actual capital structures, where
the weights in the averages are developed from the shares of each firm's
sales (and by calculation assets) in each industry.





This second derivative is positive semidefinite. As a result, an extremum
in the b's will be a minimum of the objective function.358 A. Michael Spence
The second set of conditions entails a nonlinear estimation problem,
although a relatively easy one. To find the global maximum, one can
solve these two sets of conditions sequentially for u and b. If the process
converges, it converges to the maximum likelihood estimates. As I noted
above, there are some practical computational problems in implementing
this. Nevertheless, this is the conception of the problem with which I
began the statistical work.
In section 11.4,1 have used somewhat simpler preliminary regressions
that retain the content of the model described above. Since the results do
not suggest large deviations of actual from optimal capital structures
explainable by product market and profitability variables, I have not felt
the effort of the nonlinear estimation in step 2 of the maximum likelihood
procedure had a sufficiently high payoff to justify the effort and cost.
10.3 The Product Market Environment
The hypothesis outlined above is that firms that are relatively free of
competitive pressure will use that freedom in part to maintain capital
structures that they prefer. These preferences may or may not be for
optimal capital structures. In general, we expect the deviation of actual
from optimal to be larger when the competition is less. All of this is of
course conditional on there being an optimal capital structure.
There are two ways to measure "competitiveness" in the environment.
One is to use various measures of return on investment or assets, perhaps
with adjustments for risk. (In this first pass, I have not used security
market data to adjust returns for risk, though I plan to do so in future
work, particularly in the ROA equations.) Returns measure the effect of
insulation from competition in the market environment. The second
method is to employ product market characteristics, specifically, vari-
ables that directly and indirectly measure entry barriers, potential oligop-
olistic consensus, or both. Further, one can combine certain entry barrier
variables that are based on scale advantages with share of market data to
obtain measures of the firm's competitive position in the various markets
in which it operates. I have used both approaches together on the ground
that the entry barrier measures are imperfect, and hence that the return
data contain additional information not available in the product market
data.
Attaching to each firm are two kinds of variables. One group consists of
financial variables, the other of industry variables. For diversified firms,
each variable in the latter group is a weighted average across the indus-
tries in which the firm operates, with the weights being the share of the
firm's sales in each of the relevant industries. For example, if CI4, is the
four-firm concentration ratio for industry i, and C4; is the four-firm
concentration variable for firm j, then359 Capital Structure and the Product Market Environment
(10) C4j = XSjiCl4it
where, as before, s^is the fraction of firm/'s sales (or assets) in industry i.
Thus the product market environment of each firm is measured by a
collection of variables each of which is a weighted average of the attri-
butes of the industries in which the firm participates.
Table 10.1 summarizes the variables that have been used thus far to
describe the firm. Product market data are for 1972. Financial data are
5-year averages for 1970-74, the period bracketing 1972. The variables in
table 10.1 are the variables I labeled x in the preceding section. They are
the hypothesized determinants of the variance.
The definition of capital structure, DEBT/A, includes short-term
debt. I included short-term debt because (a) some of it is maturing
longer-term debt and (b) some of the rest (principally bank debt), while
formally short term, is often short term only in name. The bank does have
options with respect to constraining corporate decisions that are not
available to bondholders. So there are important differences. But I felt it
would be misleading to label all short-term bank debt "short-term financ-
ing," when it is often part of the longer-term capitalization of the cor-
poration.
The financial variables here are all based on book value. In the case of
rates of return on assets and equity, there is a good reason for this. We
need measures of above- and below-average profitability. Stock market
returns reflect risk but not market power except in the period when the
market becomes aware of the firm's market power and capitalizes it in the
stock price. This is not to say that the book rates of return data are ideal.
In fact, there are numerous sources of noise which produce a disconcert-
ing increase in the unexplained variance.
For capital structure, the use of market values would be preferable.
But it is costly and difficult to assemble accurate market value data for
debt. This study is a cross-section study, so the problems of inflation and
interest rate changes that contaminate intertemporal comparisons of
leverage using book values do not arise in a severe form here.
I will not review the entire contents of the literature in industrial
organization to develop the argument that these variables are pertinent
product market characteristics from the standpoint of determining profit-
ability. However, some brief comment is in order. The industry variables
are largely industry's characteristics that affect barriers to new competi-
tion. That would apply to MES, CDR, A/S, and P/VA as a measure of
labor intensity (or absence of capital intensity). Capital intensity is associ-
ated with sunk costs and irreversibility that to some extent deters entry.
The share of market variable is correlated with relative costs in industries
with substantial scale economies. I have interacted market share with
several of the entry barrier variables because the latter capture industry
attributes that cause there to be scale-related advantages at the firm level.360 A. Michael Spence
The firm-specific variables measure capital structure (DEBT/A) and
profitability (ROA and ROE). Because ROE is influenced by capital
structure, I have used the return before tax and interest on total assets as













Return on book value of equity
Ratio of current assets to current liabilities
Return on book value of assets (ebit divided by
assets)
The max of ROA minus the mean (M) of ROA
and zero
The max of ROA minus (M + S) where S is the
standard deviation of ROA, and zero
The max of M minus ROA and zero
The max of (M - S) minus ROA and zero
Current plus long-term debt divided by assets












HERF The sum of the squared shares of the firm across f
all industries
A Total assets of the firm f
OPTIM The calculated optimal capital structure f
C4 4-firm concentration ratio I
C8 8-firm concentration ratio I
C20 20-firm concentration ratio I
MES Minimum efficient scale of plant I
CDR Cost disadvantage ratio for small est's I
A/S Advertising to sales ratio I
P/VA Payroll divided by value added: a measure of labor I
intensity
VA/A Value added divided by assets I
SOM Share of industry sales I
SOM*A/S Market share times advertising to sales ration I
SOM*MES Market share times minimum efficient scale plant I
SOM/CDR Market share divided by cost disadvantage ratio I
SOM/C4 Market share divided by share of top four firms I361 Capital Structure and the Product Market Environment
determined directly by the firm's competitive position in the various
industries in which it operates. The ratio CA/CL is a measure of the
resources the firm has for investment. The data and tests below strongly
suggest that firms with substantial resources use them and tend not to use
debt. The variable PPE/A is included in order to test the hypothesis that
debt is used more readily if there are durable assets to collateralize the
debt. Finally, I have calculated the Herfindahl index of diversification
across product markets for each firm. This was done for two reasons. One
is that it may directly affect capital structure decisions. The other is that I
have used this index to segregate relatively undiversified firms from the
full sample of 1,183 firms and have run several of the statistical tests on
the more limited sample. In terms of the preceding notation, the Herfin-
dahl index is
(11) Hj = Xsji.
A firm with a Herfindahl index of .625 must have at least 75% of its sales
in a single industry.
2 This is the cutoff I have used in the subsequent
analysis to identify relatively undiversified firms.
Finally, an explanation of the variables derived from ROA is required.
These are an attempt to separate profitability into four categories: high,
very high, low, and very low. The easiest way to explain the variables is to
draw a picture of them. Figure 10.1 shows each variable as a function of
ROA itself.
10.4 The Results for Deviations of Actual from
Optimal Capital Structures
Because of the cost of some of the computations, I ran some prelimi-
nary regressions to obtain an indication of the explanatory power of the
product market variables. These preliminary results are described below.
One step in the maximum likelihood estimation procedure is the
calculation of the weighted regression coefficients,






This regression has to be repeated (with 403 variables on the right-hand
side) each time new estimates of the firm-specific variances are derived.
Instead, I estimated the unweighted coefficients




These are unbiased but not minimum variance estimates of industry
optimal capital structures.
3 It is also the first step in the maximum likeli-
hood sequence. Given the estimates u, I calculate






r = rate of return
m= the mean of r
s = the standard deviation of r
for each firm; = 1,...,«. These are the deviations of the actual from the
estimated optimal capital structures for each firm.
The second step in the maximum likelihood algorithm is a nonlinear
estimation problem. I replaced it for exploratory purposes with a simple
regression. The dependent variable is the absolute value of e;, or ef, or
the natural log of the absolute value of ey. The regression is
(15) Vj = bxj + rj,
where the r;- are independently identically distributed normal random
variables (we hope). I eliminated observations with missing data and in
addition excluded observations for which any of the following were
satisfied:
1) The deviation from optimal capital structure was outside the range
[-1,1].
2) The value of ROA was outside the range [ — .5, .5].
3) In most cases, I eliminated firms with DEBT/A outside the range
[0, .7]. The reason for this was that I discovered that in the regressions363 Capital Structure and the Product Market Environment
explaining deviations of optimal from actual capital structure, the vari-
able DEBT/A explained most of the variance and that was because of a
few very high values of DEBT/A. It is worth noting that those outliers are
there, but I felt that they made the regression results misleading. Collec-
tively these restrictions reduced the sample of firms by about 200 firms.
The regressions that follow are run with each variable normalized so
that its standard deviation is one. Therefore the regression coefficient is
the change in the dependent variable measured as a fraction of the
standard deviation of that variable that results from a 1 S.D. change in the
associated independent variable. The tables reporting the results give the
coefficient estimate and the standard error. I will generally refer to a
variable as significant if the probability that it is zero is below 10%.
Table 10.2, column 1, contains the estimates for the log of the absolute
value of the deviations. The collective explanatory power of these vari-
ables is not great. The R
2 is .054. Focusing on the significant coefficients
would lead one to the following conclusions. High-return firms have
lower than average deviations, while very high-return firms have higher
than average differences between actual and optimal capital structure. I
did not find this surprising since the motivation for the hypothesis origi-
nally was that very high-return firms, protected in the product markets,
were subject to less pressure, and hence were more likely to pursue
independent capital structure policies.
Table 10.2, column 2, is the same regression with the absolute value of
the deviation as the dependent variable. The results are qualitatively
similar, and the fit is somewhat better. Here one can see that in addition
to the effects mentioned above, low-return firms have above average
deviations while very low-return firms are closer to the optimal levels.
Corporations with resources in the form of a high CA/CL tend to have
larger deviations though the relationship is not statistically strong in this
regression. The concentration numbers are best interpreted as coming
from a specification of the form
(16) flc4 + b(c8 - c4).
In these terms a would be - .119 and b would be - .313. Thus both high
four-firm concentration and high incremental concentration between
four and eight firms lower the deviations. This is counter to the hypoth-
esis that freedom from product market pressure increases the deviation.
Labor-intensive firms are nearer to the optimal levels. Generally such
firms are less protected by entry barriers. And firms with high absolute
levels of DEBT/A have higher deviations, even though the upper tail of
the distribution of DEBT/A was removed from the sample.
Table 10.2, column 3, is once again the same regression with the square
of the deviation as the dependent variable. The results here are quite
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I ran the regression for ABSDEV with the product market variables
removed in order to determine whether the financial variables explained
most of the variance in the deviations. The results are in table 10.2,
column 4. The R
2 falls significantly and the influences of the remaining
financial variables remains the same. It is perhaps worth noting that in the
squared deviation regression (col. 3) the Herfindahl index has a positive
and significant influence on the deviation. The interpretation is that large
deviations are more likely if the firm is undiversified. Recall that diver-
sification declines as the Herfindahl index increases.
Column 5 in table 10.2 includes total assets as a right-hand side vari-
able, as a measure of firm size.
4 It is positive in its effect on deviations of
actual from optimal capital structure and significant. A related result
reported later (table 10.4, col. 26) is that firm size has a negative and
significant effect on actual capital structure. As I had expected size to
increase the attractiveness of leverage, I do not, at the moment, have an
explanation for this result. Note, however, that the Herfindahl measure
of diversification is in both equations. It is negative in inference, i.e., high
diversification does increase leverage.
The principal point that needs to be made is that the differences
between actual and weighted average optimal capital structures are re-
lated to certain financial and product market variables but the latter do
not explain much of the variation in the deviations. These results are
consistent with two different views of capital structure. One is that capital
structure does not strongly influence costs or total value for reasons that
recent general equilibrium theories predict. The other is that firms do not
deviate much from optimal capital structures in ways that are systemati-
cally related to their profitability, their diversification and their product
market environments. But these results could not be taken as strong
disconfirmation of the modern forms of the Modigliani-Miller proposi-
tions. Later I will argue that actual capital structures are quite strongly
related to financial and product market characteristics of the firm and to
the optimal levels of DEBT/A. I will return to this general question when
we get to those results.
10.4.1 Undiversified Firms
It would seem desirable to confirm these results by conducting the
analysis on a subsample of undiversified firms.
5 There are two aspects to
this problem. One involves estimating the optimal industry capital struc-
tures using undiversified firms. That would certainly reduce the complex-
ity of the first part of the estimation process. But with this sample of 1,183
firms, it is not possible to do this. There are only 112 single-industry firms,
not sufficient with 403 industries. If we take only firms with Herfindahl
indices in excess of .625 so that they must have at least 75% of sales in
some industries, the number of firms with that set of characteristics is 384367 Capital Structure and the Product Market Environment
and they only cover 326 industries. The completely undiversified firms
cover only 85 industries, and there are not enough observations on each
industry to be confident of the results.
On the other hand, I did test all hypotheses including those above using
the restricted sample of firms with HERF in excess of .625. For these
regressions, the deviations are calculated using the estimated industry
optimal capital structures, which in turn were calculated using the full
sample of firms, including the diversified ones.
Table 10.2, columns 6, 7, 8, and 9 duplicate columns 1, 2, 3, and 4, but
the regressions were run on the restricted sample. The results are similar,
the most interesting difference being that the explained variance is
roughly doubled in each case. It seems fairly clear that the diversified firm
sample contains more noise in the relation between optimal and actual
capital structure.
10.5 The Determinants of Rate of Return
The product market variables have a reasonable amount of explana-
tory power with respect to the rate of return on assets for the corporation.
Table 10.3, column 10 is the regression of ROA on the product market
variables and certain firm-specific variables. Table 10.3, column 10 con-
tains only the product market variables: specifically, CA/CL and DEBT/
A have been excluded. The product market variables themselves explain
about 10% of the variance, with labor intensity being the most powerful
influence (in the downward direction) on profitability. When the financial
variables are added the R
2 jumps to 35%. Clearly there is a very high
correlation between high returns, on the one hand, and high liquidity and
low debt, on the other. Similar results hold if one substitutes MXR-MO
(the high returns) as a dependent variable. The numbers are in table 10.3,
columns 11 and 18. Column 11 contains the full set of explanatory
variables, and column 18 is confined to the product market variables.
Column 12 shows the explanatory variables for low-return firms. These
are broadly similar to the ROA regression, with signs reversed since the
variable is mean of ROA—ROA id ROA is less than the mean. Column
13 contains the firm-size variable (total assets). It is not significant as a
determinant of ROA.
The financial variables should not be construed as causes of high
returns on investment except perhaps as a second-order effect. Therefore
the coefficients on CA/CL and DEBT/A should be regarded as interest-
ing partial correlations, but the variables are not determinants of ROA.
The product market variables do not explain as much of the variance in
ROA as they should. One possible reason is that the market share data
contain substantial measurement errors. I reran ROA equations for
undiversified firms with Herfindahl indices in excess of .625. As noted
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at least 75% of its sales. The results are contained in in table 10.3,
columns 14, 15, 16, and 19. Column 19 was only product market vari-
ables. Finally, column 20 is like column 19 but the dependent variable is
the return for high-return firms. Generally the explained variance is
higher, suggesting that the purely product market determinants of ROA
are more precise variables for undiversified firms and that the modest
showing of the product market variables in the full sample is due in part to
noise in the share data or in the rate-of-return figures themselves.
10.6 Actual Capital Structure
Let me now turn to the capital structure. In the case of return on assets,
one would expect the product markets to be the principal determinants of
ROA. The explanatory power of the financial variables, while interest-
ing, is not causal. For capital structure, it is more likely that an abundance
of financial resources would cause the firm to limit its use of debt. I have
explored the determinants of capital structure using these data and a
sequence of regressions which are reported below. Table 10.4, column
21, is a regression of capital structure on the full complement of product
and financial variables, with one exception which I shall come to shortly.
The regression explains 40% of the variance. There is a lengthy list of
significant variables. Liquidity as measured by CA/CL has a strong
negative effect on debt. Apparently, on average corporations use debt as
a low-cost source of capital when they need it. High returns reduce debt,
and low returns increase it. However, very low returns reduce debt. The
Herfindahl index reduces debt. Remember that a high Herfindahl index is
associated with the absence of diversification. Thus diversified firms have
a pronounced tendency to hold more debt.
Column 22 removes the product market variables and column 23 takes
out CA/CL in addition. The explained variance is not reduced dramati-
cally. The capital structure decision appears to be strongly influenced by
profitability, financial resources, and diversification.
In preceding sections I calculated an optimal capital structure for each
firm, based on the estimated optimal capital structures at the industry
level. I put the calculated optimal capital structure for the firm on the
right-hand side in the equation explaining actual capital structure. Table
10.4, columns 25 and 26, contain the results: in 26, the product market
variables are missing, while in 25 the full complement of variables is
included. In both cases the optimum capital structure has a strong posi-
tive influence on the actual capital structure, and it increases the ex-
plained variance by about 10 percentage points. The explained variance is
in the neighborhood of 50%. Thus it appears that the calculated optimal
capital structures capture features of the industry environment that in-
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Column 27 is a regression of the calculated optimal capital structure for
the firm on variables describing its product market environment. The R2
is .079, which is modest. The significant variables are market share,
advertising intensity, and value added as a fraction of assets.
Columns 28, 29, and 30 are similar regressions run on the sample with
HERF > .625. These results accord with the full sample results.
For reasons suggested earlier, I limited the sample to firms with Herfin-
dahl indices in excess of .85. This is the largest value of HERF which
leaves the sample size at a hundred firms. If this sample were used to
estimate industry capital structures for the industries which have at least
one firm, the industry optimal capital structures would be very close to
the firm's actual capital structures. With HERT = .85, a firm would have
to have at least 92% of its sales in a single industry. Table 10.4, columns
31 and 32, contains the results. In column 32 the product market variables
are left out, the effect being to lower the R
2 by 10 from 50 to 40. The
results are similar to those for the full sample. Of course the explanatory
power of HERF is reduced. The principal difference is that in the small
sample, the rate of return variables have lost their statistical significance.
It seems reasonable to ask whether the product market variables
explain any of the variance in the calculated optimal capital structure
variable. The answer is yes, about 8%. The results are in table 10.4,
column 27. Here the right-hand-side variables are confined entirely to
product market variables.
10.7 Conclusions
Several conclusions are suggested by these data analyzed in this way.
The product market and financial variables explain a significant amount
of the interfirm variability in capital structure (i.e., the use of debt).
Particularly striking is the propensity of firms with financial resources,
high profitability, or both to substitute those resources for debt. Diver-
sified firms use more debt and large firms (as measured by assets) use less,
other things equal. Labor intensive firms use less debt. The capital
structure therefore appears to be systematically related to the character-
istics of the product market environment and to the financial condition of
the firm.
The tests for determinants of deviations of actual from calculated
optimal capital structures lead to negative results. The deviations were
not systematically related to the product market, the competitive condi-
tions, or the financial condition of the firm. There are two possible
explanations for these results. One is that there is no optimal capital
structure for the firm. The other is that there is an optimal capital
structure but that deviations from it are either small or unsystematic. Is
there any basis for choosing between these views? It is useful to remem-376 A. Michael Spence
ber that actual capital is systematically related to the product market
environment and the financial condition of the firm. That suggests, but
does not prove, that there are optimal capital structures. But it is also
consistent with the view that managers have preferences, and that these
preferences are to some extent shared. To the extent that they are shared,
they will tend to show up systematically in the actual capital structures
and then get built into the calculations of the optimal capital structure by
the techniques described above. I mention this because it would explain
why competitive pressure has so little explanatory power with respect to
deviations of the actual from the average capital structure. I have been
referring to the average as the optimum. But if the argument just outlined
is true, the optimal and the average would not be the same. And one
would not expect that product market pressure would be systematically
related to differences between actual and average levels of leverage.
The rates of return figures are only moderately well explained by the
product market data. This is somewhat disappointing. The data provide a
reasonably complete characterization of the product market environ-
ment, but it is still not complete enough. It lacks the capacity to explain a
large fraction of the variability in rates of return. On the other hand, both
product market and financial data seem to explain a substantial portion of
the variation in capital structure.
This leads me to conjecture that there is a substantial amount of
"noise" not only in the market share data but also in the rate of return
data themselves. By noise I mean elements of variation that are related to
measurement differences across firms but that are extrinsic to the fun-
damental relationship between competitive position and profitability.
Future research will focus on the determinants of relative profitability
across firms and on the related measurement problems.
My overall reaction is as follows. There seems little doubt that the
financial condition of a firm (the return on its assets, and liquid assets for
investment purposes) influences its capital structure decisions. The prod-
uct market exhibits a strong influence as well. The question is whether
these influences are reflections of differences in optimal leverage or not.
The alternative is that they reflect preferences that are shared and hence
systematic. Note that if the preferences were random around an opti-
mum, as I conjectured originally, then the product market and financial
variables would "explain" actual capital structures because they affect
optimal capital structures.
If the deviations of actual from hypothesized optimal capital structures
had been well explained by competitive pressure, then one would have
been inclined to accept the view that there are optimal capital structures.
But they were not well explained by competitive pressure or financial
condition. Hence one is left with two possibilities: (1) that there are not
capital structures, and (2) that there are no systematic deviations from
them. If one opts for the latter, then the fact that actual capital structures377 Capital Structure and the Product Market Environment
vary with product market and financial conditions comes as no surprise. If
one opts for the former, then some alternative explanation of the actual
leverage regressions seems needed. One such alternative is shared or
partially shared preferences. One example, which is consistent with the
data, would be "Don't use debt if the earnings flow is generous enough to
make it unnecessary."
In either case, these data do not permit us to differentiate between
these two views. In order to distinguish them, one would need an accu-
rate empirical model of the determinants of market value for firms. If one
had that, then the test would be whether the leverage was an influence by
seeing whether its coefficient in such a model was significant.
The product market data are moderately successful in accounting for
intern*rm differences in return on assets, particularly for undiversified
firms. For diversified firms, their explanatory power is reduced. I believe
that is in part because of noise in market share data. Market shares are
notoriously difficult to assess accurately.
Notes
1. This research was supported by the National Bureau of Economic Research. Exten-
sive support in the form of data and computer services was provided by the Project in
Industry and Competitive Analysis at the Harvard Business School. I am grateful to both
organizations for this support. Benjamin M. Friedman gave me numerous useful ideas and
some very helpful critical comments on earlier drafts. I should like to thank him for his help.
1. Robert Taggart made this useful point, for which I am grateful.
2. To see this, suppose that s is the largest share for the firm. Its Herfindahl index is
largest if all the rest of its sales are in a single other industry, in which case its share in the
second industry is (1 — s). Its index is therefore 2s
2 — 2s + 1. This function is mono tonic on
the interval [.5,1], and has the value .625 when s = .75. Thus if H > .625, then s must be
greater than .75. This is how the index is used to pick off firms with sales concentrated in a
single industry.
Performing regressions with 403 right-hand-side variables is not a trivial task, and cannot
be undertaken with standard programs. It is not possible simply to invert a 403 x 403-square
matrix with standard algorithms. These estimates are derived by directly minimizing the
sum of squared residuals using a gradient descent method.
4. This variable was included as a result of a suggestion and comment by Stephen Ross.
5. Checking the results by restricting the sample was suggested by several members
present at the first conference.
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Comment John T. Scott
A difficulty in using data to determine if capital structures are optimal in
an economically meaningful sense is that firms conceivably choose capital
structures for noneconomic reasons. A structure might be chosen be-
cause it is, let us say, "fashionable" rather than because it is a value-
maximizing one. One way around this is to build and test models to see if
observed capital structures are responsive to factors which various
theories of capital structure imply are important. The work of Taggart,
Auerbach, and others at this conference is in that spirit. An attractive
aspect of Michael Spence's approach to the capital structure question is
that, by looking not only at average chosen capital structures but also at
the dispersion of such structures, an alternative interesting way to get at
the question of whether there is anything economically meaningful in
observed capital structures is provided as long as there is a sufficiently
strong direct relation between value-maximizing behavior and the com-
petitiveness of product markets. The hypothesis about value-maximizing
and competitive conditions is an important one, and its statistical concep-
tualization is stimulating and of broader usefulness than the issue of
capital structure. I do, however, have concerns about the present applica-
tion of the innovative part of the methodology.
I am concerned that the optimal capital structures calculated by
Spence's approach will be wrong, even though fairly highly correlated
with actual structures, because I do not believe the model that fits them is
consistent with capital theory. A premise of the paper is that optimal
capital structure for a firm is its assets-weighted average of the optimal
capital structures for the industries in which it produces. I think various
theories of capital structure offer reasons to question the premise that the
value-maximizing capital structure for assets deployed in an industry is
unique regardless of the firm controlling the assets. For examples, tax
shields would to a large extent be firm specific and imply different optimal
leverage for two firms financing assets in the same industry category given
different losses in other categories, and tax clienteles could conceivably
be different for firms operating in some of the same industry categories. I
would like to focus briefly on well-known implications of "bankruptcy
costs" for capital structure, to provide a clear explanation of why I am
uncertain of the appropriateness of the underlying premise of industry-
specific optimal capital structures.
The Modigliani-Miller theorem teaches that, if financial markets work
reasonably well, a firm's capital structure will matter only if aspects,
about which investors care, of the probability distributions over operat-
ing earnings are not invariant to capital structure. A priori, the variance
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in the effect of leverage on the probability of incurring costs of getting
into trouble with debt might be a cause of significant variance across firms
in optimal capital structure. Such costs of trouble have probability zero if
there is no debt in the capital structure. They are incurred when realized
earnings available for both stockholders and creditors are insufficient to
service the contractual interest obligations of debt and when downward
capital market revaluations wipe out the value of equity.
If we decompose the randomness of the periodic earnings available for
the stockholders and creditors of the firm into a short-run component for
a given state and a long-run component measuring the likelihood of the
transition to a less desirable state, the probability of "getting into trou-
ble" with a given amount of debt in the capital structure should vary
directly with those sources of randomness. Thus, I believe the theory of
capital structure teaches us that if there were an optimal capital structure
for a firm, an important determinant of the variance in the optimal
structure across firms would be the variance across firms in the character-
istics of the randomness of operating earnings. In short, on the simple
issue of bankruptcy costs, I would expect differences in business risk
across firms to correlate with the amount of leverage they can achieve
before exposing themselves to "too much financial risk," since ceteris
paribus more business risk increases the probability of getting into trou-
ble with debt. The relevant risk here is a total risk of the firm which
depends on the correlation of returns across the firm's various activities
even in the absence of any synergies in production across the firm's lines
of business. In other words, pure financial diversification affects the
probability of incurring bankruptcy costs. For a simple heuristic example,
consider two industries with operating earnings having expected values
Ox and O2, standard deviations o^ and cr2, and simple correlation coef-
ficient P12 = -1. A firm that deploys a share ax of the assets in industry 1
and a2 in industry 2 has earnings with standard deviation a^x — a2o-2,
which would be zero if eti/a2 = o^/o-!. Such a firm could promise all of its
expected earnings of axOi + a202 as interest on debt yet have no
probability of incurring bankruptcy costs. In general its optimal leverage
would not be its assets-weighted average of optimal leverages for single-
product firms in industries 1 and 2. Once we relax the assumption of no
industry-specific production effects from diversification, it is possible that
we would find single-product firms alongside multiple-product firms with
the former avoiding real diseconomies of multiproduct operations but
incurring some penalty in the form of greater concern with bankruptcy
costs while the latter offset diseconomies of multi-industry production
with lower expected bankruptcy costs.
One way to test the inappropriateness of the underlying specification
would be to take the residuals from the industry-specific effect model and
correlate them with various characteristics of firms. One would want to380 A. Michael Spence
use algebraic values, so the tests in the paper using absolute values or
squared deviations will not do for a check of firm-specific effects. I would
still be unconvinced by the exercise, though, because I do not think there
has been enough modeling of what those firm-specific effects and hence
the explanatory variables should be.
My concern with the paper's underlying premise does not presume
there is an optimal capital structure, but just that to allow rejection of that
possibility or to calculate estimates of such optimal structures, the model
specified must be consistent with the theory of optimal capital structure.
Even to get the industry-specific effects, in general we need the whole
model that includes the industry-specific effects but does not exclude
other effects. Industry effects need to be part of a coherent model that is
consistent with the theoretical reasons for optimal capital structure. I do
believe that a variant of the model could allow rejection of the hypothesis
that there is no optimal capital structure, yet rejection of the alternative
or estimates of its parameters does not seem conclusive given the
premises.
Since the question of whether and to what extent we can reject a null
hypothesis of no optimal capital structure is of interest, I would like to
contribute two simple tests.
First, if capital structure were utterly irrelevant, having neither eco-
nomic nor noneconomic motivation, we could say that all capital struc-
tures were equally likely. The ratio of debt to assets for a firm would be a
random variable, x, with uniform distribution over the range 0-1. Thus,
f(x) = 1 for x = [0, 1] and zero otherwise; F(x) = fof(x)dx = x. For
any firm, leverage would then have expected value of .5 and variance
1/12. The average leverage for a sample of N firms would have expected
value of .5 and standard deviation of .289/y/N. One is then tempted to
reject the null hypothesis of complete irrelevance (conditional, of course,
on the factors determining the sample) by observing the several tables in
Robert Taggart's contribution to this volume (table 1.1, Cols. 3 and 6;
table 1.2, cols. 1, 2, 4, and 5; table 1.3, cols. 1, 2; table 1.4, col. 1). Only
for table 1.1, column 6, which shows book value balance sheet ratios of
debt to assets during the 1970s for U.S. manufacturing firms, do we find
anything looking like an average of .5. But it turns out even that is not
consistent with total irrelevance because of underdispersion in the data.
For my own sample of 376 large U.S. manufacturing firms examined
below, COMPUSTAT book values show their average leverage, defined
broadly as total liabilities divided by total assets over the years 1974,
1975, 1976, was .501, but the unbiased and consistent estimate of the
variance was .0140, which is far less than .0833. Defined narrowly as total
debt divided by total assets, the average COMPUSTAT leverage for my
sample is .246 with variance of .01245. This suggests, incidentally, that
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of about .25 using market values and those of about .50 using book values
may reflect sample selection rather than the use of market instead of book
values. Evidently, there is at any point in time at least one "fashionable"
capital structure, and one might suspect the average has some economic
significance.
Second, although for the reasons above I do not believe industry-
specific "optimal capital structures" are invariant to the firm in which
they are embedded, I do believe such a fixed-coefficient model would
allow rejection of the hypothesis that there is only one "fashionable"
capital structure.
Let n denote the nth company and / denote the yth of 37 activity
categories (20 two-digit manufacturing, 14 nonmanufacturing, miscel-
laneous, domestic regulated, and foreign categories). Let A — [anj] be
the 376 x 37 matrix with representative element anj, anj = AnjIXjAnj, where Anj denotes the assets of the nth firm in the yth category.
If in fact there is only one "fashionable" capital structure characterized
by a such that
where D denotes debt and E denotes equity, then observed capital
structure will equal the "optimal" or "fashionable" plus error:
Dn _
where %ani = 1, and
and I assume en is (close to) a normally distributed random variable with
mean zero and the same variance for all n. If there were only one
"fashionable" (perhaps "optimal") capital structure, then the model
D/(D + E) — a + e is theoretically equivalent to the model D/(D + E)
= XjUjCij + e, since the latter reduces directly to the former. Statistically,
if we fit the two models, by choosing a and the a; to minimize the sum of
squared residuals, reduction in the sum of squared residuals as we move
from the former to the latter model will be insignificant if the null
hypothesis is true.
For the 376 companies for which I could obtain complete data, using
both COMPUSTAT and data available at the Federal Trade Commis-
sion's Line of Business Program, to compute for each company each
variable over the 3-year period 1974-76, the [reduction of residual sum of
squares as we go from the restricted to unrestricted model/36] divided by382 A. Michael Spence
[the residual sum of squares for the unrestricted model/339] is under the
null hypothesis distributed as F with 36 and 339 degrees of freedom. I
have fit the two models, computed the sums of squared residuals, and
finally the F-ratio (and equivalently the F-ratio for the model which drops
one column from A and fits an intercept). The probability of getting an F
as large as observed would be far less than .01 if the null hypothesis were
true, for both the broad and narrow definitions of leverage.
Evidently there are significant differences in capital structures. To
make progress in understanding this alternative to the null hypotheses
(both rejected) of utter irrelevance or only one relevant structure except
for random error, we need to specify and test alternative theories of how
product-market structure affects optimal capital structures. From the
tests above, I am fairly sure there is at least significant variance in
"fashionable" capital structures, and I suspect these differences have
economic significance, but I await conclusive evidence.
Regarding the paper's profitability results, I have concerns about two
major factors that have been left out. As Spence recognizes, it would be
desirable to sweep out the variance across firms in normal rates of return.
That is, a priori, I would expect a normal rate of return to be higher for
some firms than for others, whether one subscribes to CAPM or some
other model of equilibrium rates of return.
Second, I think a large part of the explainable (i.e., nonrandom)
information in profitability has to do with multimarket interdependence
of firms—because of its effects on conjectural variations within markets
and on entry conditions across markets. I would expect these factors
might be correlated in the sample with included variables, some of which
may be irrelevant and yet the expected value of their coefficients will not
be zero if they are correlated with the left-out variables. In any case I
believe the two excluded considerations are a priori important.
Regarding the regressions of debt to assets on various explanatory
variables, (1) I do not think the u/s estimated can be "optimal" for the
reasons above. That is, they are estimated in a model that I do not believe
is consistent with theories of optimal structure. (2) I would like to see
explicit development of why particular variables would be important,
entering them to test various theories of how product market characteris-
tics might explain capital structures that maximize value. For example, an
R&D-intensive environment might be an indicator of an environment
with a high probability of an undesirable transition to another state.
Thus, a strong negative correlation of R&D intensity with leverage could
be taken as evidence in favor of the bankruptcy cost theory of optimal
structure. Then again, it could be interpreted otherwise as in the con-
tribution of Long and Malitz (chap. 9 "Investment Patterns and Financial
Leverage"). We need careful modeling of our statistical tests to sort out
these possibilities.